Revenue Equivalence Revisited

The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats. Consequently, we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue. They also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher. In expected utility terms though, we find that the expected utility of entering a first price sealed bid auction is greater than entering an ascending for any risk averse bidder suggesting that we are seeing “overentry” into the ascending auctions

Anomalies in Auction Choice Behavior

Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) established some interesting yet puzzling results regarding bidders’ preferences between auction formats. The finding is that bidders strongly prefer the ascending to the first price sealed bid auction on a ceteris paribus basis but they are not willing to pay up to an entry price for entering into an ascending auction instead of a first price that would equalize the profits between the two. While it was found that risk aversion on the part of the bidders could resolve this anomaly the claim that risk aversion drives overbidding in first price auctions is somewhat controversial. In this study we examine two competing explanations for the observed behavior; loss aversion and “clock aversion”, i.e. a dislike for some aspect of the clock based bidding mechanism. We find that neither alternative explanation can account for bidders’ auction choice behavior leaving risk aversion as the only un-falsified hypothesis

Maintaining efficiency while integrating entrants from lower-performing groups: an experimental study

Efficiently growing a group or firm often requires integration of individuals from lower-performing entities. We explore the effectiveness of two policies intended to facilitate such integration, using a laboratory experiment that models production as a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We initially create an efficient group and an inefficient one. We then allow individuals to move into the high-performing group and vary by treatment whether movement is unrestricted, limited to one entrant per period, or subject to an entry exam. We include two additional treatments that combine the two restrictions in different ways to help understand why the institutions are effective in maintaining coordination. We find that both restrictions work to maintain efficient coordination but they are effective for different reasons.Growth, entry, coordination, experiments

Evaluation of the Specialist Community Public Health Nursing Peripatetic Assessment Model

The Health Visitor Implementation Plan 2011-15: a call to action, called for an additional 4200 health visitors to be trained by 2015. To accommodate larger numbers of students, specialist community public health nursing (SCPHN) programmes across the UK have undergone significant transformation in terms of practice supervision. Somerset Partnership NHS Trust introduced a peripatetic assessment model involving practice teachers and practice mentors. This differed from traditional one-to-one approaches of supervision to one-to-three. Practice teachers mostly supervised students through close collaboration with mentors who worked directly with students on a daily basis. Using a mixed methods approach, the evaluation aimed to assess the effectiveness of the new model from the perspective of SCPHN students, mentors, practice teachers (PTs) and managers. Data was collected through an anonymous online survey and individual interviews or focus groups. Overall, participants were positive about the peripatetic model’s impact on student learning and practice experience, in addition to the general up-skilling of the wider health visiting workforce and possible implications of continuation into the future. Any concerns raised focused on adequate preparation and support for mentors and the need for clear communication and role differentiation between practice teachers and mentors

Bidder Preferences Among Auction Institutions

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. We seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction to a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects can be shown to be willing to pay more to enter the ascending auction than is explainable by their risk attitudes when accounting for their expectations about the risk preferences of their opponents.auctions, mechanism design, electronic markets

Revenue Equivalence Revisited

The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats. Consequently, we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue. They also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher. In expected utility terms though, we find that the expected utility of entering a first price sealed bid auction is greater than entering an ascending for any risk averse bidder suggesting that we are seeing “overentry†into the ascending auctions.bidder preferences; private values; sealed bid auctions; ascending auctions; endogenous entry

CLEAR: Covariant LEAst-square Re-fitting with applications to image restoration

In this paper, we propose a new framework to remove parts of the systematic errors affecting popular restoration algorithms, with a special focus for image processing tasks. Generalizing ideas that emerged for $\ell_1$ regularization, we develop an approach re-fitting the results of standard methods towards the input data. Total variation regularizations and non-local means are special cases of interest. We identify important covariant information that should be preserved by the re-fitting method, and emphasize the importance of preserving the Jacobian (w.r.t. the observed signal) of the original estimator. Then, we provide an approach that has a "twicing" flavor and allows re-fitting the restored signal by adding back a local affine transformation of the residual term. We illustrate the benefits of our method on numerical simulations for image restoration tasks

A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions

Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience. We go on to examine the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions.auction theory, ascending auctions, jump bidding